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have published a series of papers examining differences in the negativity bias as a function of clinical diagnosis, and the effects of treatment (i.e., Behavioral Activation therapy, most strongly) on biases in affective processing (Gollan et al., 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Rosebrock et al., 2016). Taken together, these studies demonstrate the utility of applying a theory about affective processing to understanding differences in those processes in healthy vs. clinically depressed and anxious samples to, ultimately, effects of treatment on regulating those processes.  Furthermore, the incorporation of physiological and neural measures to research on the negativity bias has allowed for investigations into its underlying mechanisms. Both ERP and fMRI data have suggested that the negativity bias emerges relatively early in processing, driving attention towards unpleasant vs. pleasant stimuli (Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand; 2003; Norris & Cacioppo, 2019), but have also demonstrated that this bias is maintained in later stages (e.g., the late positive potential of the ERP, associated with affective categorization; Ito et al., 1998), and that it may even affect recovery from unpleasant stimuli in individuals higher in neuroticism (Norris, Larsen & Cacioppo, 2007). By taking a multimethod, multilevel approach to studying the negativity bias, John’s work has opened doors to understanding the instantiation and consequences of a bias towards unpleasant and aversive stimuli.  In sum, John’s theoretical and empirical work on the negativity bias is illustrative of his contributions to multiple fields and has far-reaching implications for understanding human behavior. 




















in output of the positivity and negativity systems is observed1; but that for every additional unit of input, negativity increases at a faster rate than does positivity, resulting in greater output of the negative system than the positive system at higher levels of input. Furthermore, the activation functions for positivity and negativity are predicted to be negatively-accelerating, meaning that their slopes decrease (i.e., flatten) as input increases. The ESM also predicts a negativity bias in the degree of negative deceleration, such that the slope of the activation function for negativity is predicted to flatten at a slower rate than the activation function for positivity (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the activation functions or gradients for positivity and negativity). Combined, these predictions imply that each additional unit of input to the negativity sub-system carries even greater weight than does each additional unit of input to the positivity system (for evidence supporting this conclusion in the realm of political attitudes, see Holbrook, Krosnick, Visser, Gardner, & Cacioppo, 2001). Norris, Gollan, Berntson and Cacioppo (2010) have previously summarized the wide-ranging evidence both for (a) the separability of positivity and negativity, and (b) a negativity bias in affective processing.  




















mates (i.e., erotica) and/or other rewards that may contribute to this success (e.g., food, resources, money). Thus, males may exhibit a weaker negativity bias than do females.  3. Similarly, as fitness needs change over the course of life, we may expect developmental differences in the magnitude of the negativity bias. First, the negativity bias may emerge later in development (i.e., not be innate), as infants become more mobile and less dependent on caregivers. Second, the negativity bias may weaken toward the end of life, after the age of primary reproductive ability (especially for females) and as we approach mortality; or at the very least, responses to certain categories of affective stimuli may change (e.g., babies, attractive conspecifics). On the other hand, a contradictory hypothesis would state that if survival is prioritized above all else, the negativity bias may emerge early in development and be relatively maintained throughout life. Although evolutionary theories are difficult to support with empirical evidence, the argument for an evolutionary explanation for the negativity bias is an important motivator for much of the research covered here, and these three hypotheses have driven a number of the studies summarized in this review.  




















 Many studies that claim to test the negativity bias fail to adequately match positive and negative stimuli, which is required for essentially any category of affective stimulus with the exception of currency (e.g., $10 is $10 regardless of whether it is won or lost, and yet a loss of $10 may have a stronger impact on emotional responses than a gain of $10; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Norris et al., 2011). Often matching may be accomplished by relying on published (or collected) normative affective ratings, as with the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008); in which case negative and positive stimuli may be chosen to be equidistant from the midpoint of the normative 
valence scale to properly calibrate extremity.3    Finally, consideration must also be given to the measurement of output, or of 
reactivity to each stimulus. Self-report measures (e.g., rating scales) may be used, but ideally not bipolar scales (i.e., ranging from very unpleasant to very pleasant). Separate unipolar scales for positivity and negativity are arguably equivalent measures of the output of the sub-systems. The Evaluative Space Grid (ESG; Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2009) was developed to more efficiently collect positive and negative responses using a single-item measure. In brief, the ESG is a 5x5 grid in which positivity is represented on the x-axis and negativity on the y-axis; participants select one of the 25 cells 










that best corresponds to their current feelings. McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman, and Schkade (2010) have also introduced a common unipolar intensity scale, in which individuals indicate the intensity of their feelings on a scale ranging from no effect to a very large effect that effectively measures reactivity to both positive and negative stimuli. In addition to self-report measures, indirect assessments, such as psychophysiological measures (e.g., ERPs, fMRI) may be used to measure output of the positivity and negativity affect sub-systems. Critically, not all psychophysiological measures are appropriate. Facial electromyography (EMG), for example, is a validated measure of positive and negative affect (i.e., over the 
zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscle groups, respectively; Larsen, Norris & Cacioppo, 2003); however, the fact that different muscle groups are differently sensitive to positive and negative affect (and that the relationship between muscle activity and valence differs for each, as well) is problematic for measuring asymmetrical responses. Similarly, neuroimaging approaches that focus on neural regions and/or networks strongly associated with either positive (e.g., nucleus accumbens) or negative (e.g., insula) affect are subject to the same criticism. In sum, researchers must be thoughtful in both the selection of stimuli (input) and of measurement of reactivity (output) in order to provide a true test of the negativity bias.   The term negativity bias has occasionally been used to describe (or has been confused with) other documented affective phenomena. We briefly cover two of these – threat bias and interpretations of ambiguity – to better illustrate how each differs from the negativity bias as predicted by the ESM.  










threat bias”, but has occasionally been termed a “negativity bias.” The dot-probe task (cf. MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1999), in which a pair of stimuli (typically faces; one neutral and one threatening) appear briefly on opposite sides of a display and are followed by a dot in the location of one of the stimuli that requires a response, is often used as a measure of threat bias (or threat avoidance, depending on trial timing). Anxious individuals exhibit strong threat bias (non-anxious sometimes do not; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakersman-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007), and interventions that target threat bias have been effective in reducing anxiety (Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin & Harmer, 2010). A great deal of research has examined the threat bias across the life span (e.g., in pediatric and adolescent anxiety; Britton et al., 2013), with different stimuli (e.g., sad, fear faces; Sylvester, Hudziak, Gaffrey, Barch, & Luby, 2016), in different psychiatric disorders (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]; Bardeen & Orcutt, 2011), and using electrophysiological approaches (e.g., ERPs; O’Toole & Dennis, 2012). Although the functioning of a threat bias (in the dot-probe task as well as many others) is consistent with the basic premise of the negativity bias (that bad is stronger than good), such studies rarely include (a) both positive and negative stimuli that are (b) matched with regard to their normative valence. Thus, studies of threat bias typically do not qualify as tests of the negativity bias, and therefore fall outside of the scope of the current paper.  
 Interpretations of ambiguity. Individuals differ in their tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli (e.g., surprise faces) as negative or positive (Kim et al., 2003).4 The term 




















interpretation of ambiguous stimuli falls outside of our definition of the negativity bias (which is focused on asymmetrical responses to equally negative and positive stimuli) and a thorough review of this literature is beyond the scope of the current paper.  
Recent Evidence Supporting a Negativity Bias 
 Given that a number of thorough, comprehensive reviews of past research supporting a negativity bias have previously been published (e.g., Taylor, 1991; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), the review of recent evidence provided here is meant to supplement and extend those previous findings and is not meant to provide complete coverage of all work supporting the negativity bias in the past 20 years. This review covers empirical work, much conducted by my colleagues and myself, in two areas. First, evidence from multiple methodologies in the field of social neuroscience (e.g., event-related brain potentials [ERPs], functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) supports the functioning of a negativity bias in neural responses to affective stimuli. Second, examining individual differences, both in personality (or factors that function like traits) and in age and sex, can shed light on the functioning of the negativity bias.  










substrates (Norris et al., 2010), giving rise to the prediction that positive/pleasant and negative/unpleasant stimuli should have differential effects on neural processes.  










press (the response hand was also blocked to allow for an investigation of the lateralized readiness potential [LRP], the latency of which is an index of primed motor behavior; Hsieh & Yu, 2003). Huang and Luo (2006) found that (a) the P2, an early attention-related component, was larger in negative than positive blocks; (b) the LPP was larger for negative than for positive images (even though both were as frequent in this design as neutral images), and (c) the latency of the LRP was shorter in negative than positive blocks. Together, these data suggest that the negativity bias emerges early in attentional processes, but extends through a later evaluative-categorization stage, and results in increased motor priming for responses to negative stimuli (Huang & Luo, 2006).  
fMRI. In addition to studying the time course and stages of processing at which a negativity bias functions in response to affective stimuli, neuroimaging research using fMRI may shed light on the neural networks implicated in the negativity bias. In two studies, undergraduate females were scanned while viewing neutral, negative, and positive images taken from the IAPS; all three categories of images were matched on dominant colors, complexity, and content, and negative and positive images were matched on extremity and arousal. In both studies, negative images elicited greater activation of BA 19 (x = 58, y = -54, 




















cortex, anterior cingulate), the insula, and primary motor areas (Norris, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2019). Ratings of negative images also decreased in latency and increased in negativity with repetition, suggesting that both neural and behavioral responses to negative stimuli are heightened with repetition, consistent with a negativity bias.  










regions).5 Finally, Weinberg and Hajcak (2010) examined ERPs to unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant IAPS images (which were subsequently divided into content categories) and found no differences in early ERPs (i.e., N1 and the Early Posterior Negativity [EPN]), but did replicate Ito et al. (1998) in that larger LPP amplitudes were elicited by unpleasant than pleasant images. When analyzing based on content, however, erotica and mutilation images elicited comparable LPPs. These results are complicated by the fact that, arguably, (a) pleasant and unpleasant images were not well matched, with unpleasant images being more extreme (Mvalence = 1.90; Mextremity = 3.1) than were pleasant images (Mvalence = 7.43; 
Mextremity = 2.43), and normative ratings are not provided for the erotica and mutilation categories. For a thorough review of ERP findings in response to unpleasant/negative and pleasant/positive images, see Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, and Polich (2008); but note that this review does not pay specific attention to the criterion of equivalency.  In sum, evidence contracting the functioning of a negativity bias in behavioral and neural responses to unpleasant vs. pleasant stimuli does exist, with some studies showing no differences and others even showing heightened responses to pleasant stimuli (especially for males’ responses to erotica); but many of these studies fail to demonstrate that they have met the criterion of equivalency.  
Individual Differences  
 Process-based measures of the negativity bias. If the negativity bias is, as we have suggested (Norris et al., 2010), evolutionarily based, we would predict that most individuals should exhibit a negativity bias, on average; but that differences in the 






























females rate erotica (as can be seen by higher standard deviations for these images in the normative ratings), which also complicates their use in such studies. We have often addressed this problem in the past by recruiting females only (although Norris, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2019 recruited only males), which allows us to both choose and match unpleasant and pleasant stimuli more carefully. Clearly, this presents an issue for generalization. A second approach that we have taken in the past (Norris et al., 2011; Study 2) is to examine the negativity bias in a game of chance, in which participants won or lost money ($1, $5, $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, $150) based on the toss of a coin. Arguably, given that $1 is a dollar whether lost or gained, this study better matched positive (wins) and negative (losses) stimuli. Results still indicated a negativity bias, and replicated the slopes predicted by the ESM. 










greater false memory for negative versus positive critical lures, consistent with a negativity bias. When tested after a 24-hr delay, only those individuals higher in neuroticism showed a maintained negativity bias in false memory, suggesting that neuroticism may increase rumination of (and subsequent “memory” for) critical lures associated with negative list words.  










was associated with a smaller negativity bias (Norris, 2019). In sum, males exhibit a smaller negativity bias, possibly encouraging more risk taking behaviors (Sapienza, Zingales, & Maestripieri, 2009), and this sex difference is driven at least in part by prenatal exposure to testosterone.  Ashare and colleagues (2013) examined the independent and interactive effects of gender and polymorphisms of the serotonin receptor gene 102T>C on individual differences in the negativity bias. Females with a C/C genotype had a higher negativity bias than did those with a T/T genotype (and the pattern was dose-dependent, as those with a T/C genotype had middling negativity biases); males showed no differences in the negativity bias across genotypes. The C/C genotype is associated with impaired emotion regulation, including the development of depression (Jokela et al., 2007), schizophrenia (Abdolmaleky, Faraone, Glatt, & Tsuang, 2004), suicide attempts (Vaquero-Lorenzo et al., 2008), and anxiety-related traits (Golimbet, Alfimova, & Mityushina, 2004). Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that the serotonin system may be implicated in the negativity bias; and that higher negativity biases may lead to affect dysregulation (at least in females).  










food, helpful others) than towards aversive or harmful stimuli (e.g., hinderers); and again, in older age when mortality is near, perhaps another shift again towards the positive.  








































middling to pleasant, and largest to unpleasant images, effectively replicating Ito and colleagues’ (1998) results within a broader age range of participants, and supporting a negativity bias in evaluative categorization. Correlations, however, indicated that age was inversely correlated with LPP amplitudes to unpleasant images (r = -.32) but was not correlated with LPP amplitudes to pleasant images (r = .00); the difference between these correlations was significant. In sum, Kisley and colleagues’ (2006, 2007) findings are consistent with a reduction (or elimination) of a neural measure of the negativity bias in older age, but they argue this reduction is due to decreased neural reactivity to negative stimuli, not to increased reactivity (or motivation) to positive stimuli. Thus, their results are somewhat in contradiction to Carstensen’s theory of the positivity effect.  










(Ingbretsen & Norris, 2019). These findings suggest that, over the life-course, highly negative but otherwise healthy individuals may experience structural and functional changes in the hippocampus and amygdala that could have implications for emotional memory and reactivity. Of course, given that these data are cross-sectional and not longitudinal, we cannot conclude causality. The relationships between trait negativity, increased reactivity to unpleasant stimuli, and the grey matter density of subcortical and limbic structures in older (but not younger) women deserve further attention.  
Summary. Reviewing the literature on the negativity bias over the lifespan has revealed mixed results. Some studies seem to show a relatively early emergence of a negativity bias (as early as 6 months of age) and a negativity bias that is maintained through older age (as late as 65-80 years of age). Other studies contradict these results and have either shown no bias or a bias towards appetitive stimuli (e.g., helpers, positive images) early and late in life. In addition, there are methodological issues with both of these populations in terms of the criterion of matching; it is difficult to know whether appetitive and aversive stimuli are matched for nonverbal infants, and normative values used to match stimuli for older populations are often based on emotional ratings provided by young adults (e.g., Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008, 2015). Given that motivations and needs do change over the course of life, future studies would do well to consider these issues and examine the developmental trajectory of the negativity bias.  
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 Figure 1. Activation functions for positive and negative dimensions of affective processing; the x-axis represents affective input, whereas the y-axis represents output of the system. The ESM proposes that there are two asymmetries in affective processing: the positivity offset is the result of greater positive than negative affect at low levels of emotional input; the negativity bias is the result of stronger responses to negative than to equally extreme positive input. Adapted from Cacioppo and Berntson (1994).    
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